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ABSTRACT
This proposal presents research issues to examine the manner in
which the Boston City Hospital has changed its operations to adapt to
the impacts of the new cost containment legislation, Chapter 372, that
exacerbates factors leading to deficits and uncertainty. The
uncertainty concerns the level of health care and supporting personnel
that can be sustained in light of increasing deficits. This proposal
states that uncertainty is a problem because it prompts severe program
and personnel cuts that would otherwise not be made.
The Fiscal, Planning, and Addiction Services departments were
selected for this research because of their different tasks and range
of responses in adapting to uncertainty. Questions are asked about
changes in adaptation through formal and informal structures,
decision-making, and organizational behavior during the interim before
Chapter 372 was passed and the time it was implemented in 1982. The
methodology advocates the consultant as a facilitator during the
process in which the departments diagnose their processes of
responding to uncertainty.
Although the research has not been conducted, it is proposed that
engaging in the self-diagnosis will improve the hospital's ability to
adapt to future problems.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Joroff
Title: Senior Lecturer
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
4Purpose
This proposal has two purposes. First, to examine how the Boston
City Hospital has modified the way it anticipates deficits and
responds to the uncertainties it causes around the actual level of
health services that can be delivered, the personnel that provide and
sustain such services and the future planning and priorities of the
hospital.
A second and equally important purpose is to initiate a process
of self-examination to aid BCH in adapting to future problems.
INTRODUCTION
Many public hospitals today are confronted with fiscal shortages,
increased demand for services from indigent patients and threats to
their existence. The Boston City Hospital ("BCH") is no exception.
The goal of the original enabling legislation in Section One of the
Acts of 1858, Chapter 113 was for the City of Boston to authorize and
establish a hospital to receive poor and unfortunate persons in need
of care. Adherence to that general goal has usurped the hospital's
control over the kinds of patients admitted for medical treatment. An
"open door" admissions policy and community declaration as the
hospital of "last resort" has translated into the receipt of poor
persons with severe medical needs.1 These factors place inordinate
burdens on BCH's clinical, administrative and human resources.
Symptoms of these burdens are the large amount of free health care
delivered and the bad debt expenses incurred by BCH. A recent shift
5in federal policies reducing entitlements and thereby increasing the
social service needs of more people and the transfer of poor patients
from private hospitals are other causes of growing deficits. Arising
from these deficits is uncertainty as to whether service delivery and
personnel can be maintained at acceptable levels.
- This research proposal presents questions to examine how BCH
responds to the uncertainty emanating from deficits. Specifical ly,
this proposal structures its inquiry to see how BCH adapted to
uncertainty in the time period before the new cost containment
legislation, Chapter 372, was passed in 1982 and the time after
Chapter 372 was implemented. The reason for this is that between the
first and second time periods, BCH may have changed its operations to
adapt to the impact of the new reimbursement law.
The contingencies prompted by Chapter 372 may have forced BCH to
evaluate its practices to see if they could withstand new pressures.
I propose that BCH's evaluation would consist of: 1) examining a wide
range of options in service and personnel reductions; 2) in-depth
consideration of ways to avoid such cuts; 3) attempting to control
segments of the environment on which BCH depends (coping) and; 4)
attempting to change its own mode of operations to better prepare for
the impacts of Chapter 372 (adapting). In other words, through a
process of reviewing practices, creating new operations and testing
them in new situations BCH may have realigned itself to the demands of
a changing environment. The process of reviewing, creating and
testing operations to achieve a new alignment of operations with
changing environments is organizational learning. The criteria to
6evidence this learning process are mentioned in one through four
above.
Thus this proposal offers research issues and the methodology for
BCH to examine its practices, relationships and processes of decision-
making that account for changes in coping with and adapting to
deficit-induced uncertainty since Chapter 372. It aims to help BCH
learn about itself by structuring a methodology for self-diagnosis.
As forecast years ago, BCH's "arrangements, extent and detail s must
necessarily be modified according to circumstances". 2 This proposal
will help BCH conclude if it has altered the way it responds to
uncertainty. An organizational self-diagnosis of this type may
pinpoint operational difficulties and improve the thoughtful transfer
of this research to other exigencies.
Chapter One discusses the main causes of BCH's deficits. The
causes of deficits, such as the transfer of the medically indigent
from private hospitals to BCH, the rate of reimbursement for services,
etc. have always existed. However, Chapter 372 exacerbates the imapct
of these contingencies. A discussion of this law, then, is necessary
to show how it accentuates uncertainty. Not only are deficits a
problem for BCH but so is the uncertainty that comes from them. This
chapter discusses how uncertainty is more than an innate trait of the
hospital, but forces BCH to take a conservative stance by making
severe cuts in program levels in anticipating very high annual
deficits. Chapter Two presents the issues to research the change,
if any, in BCH's operations to cope with and adapt to deficit-caused
uncertainty since Chapter 372. The issues explore the description of
the inputs of uncertainty to the structure, decison-making patterns
7and environments bearing on BCH. The Fiscal, Planning and Addiction
Services departments are used in this research. Chapter Three is the
methodology for conducting this study.
The conclusion explores the benefits of knowing how BCH has
changed the way it copes with and adapts to uncertainty. Implications
for collecting data on information, shifting of BCH's goals and
changes in the structures of BCH are presented.
The appendix synthesizes significant theories of organizational
learning. It is included to share the conceptual bases on which I
constructed a definition of organizational learning suitable for
studying the change in BCH's response to uncertainty.
The method of responding to uncertainty has implications for the
potential survival of BCH. One may assume that the continued
existence of BCH results, in part, from successfully adaptating to
growing deficits and the uncertainty it triggers. However, the
hospital's survival is increasingly threatened as the external
environment on which it depends becomes more turbulent. This
potential threat to survival causes a greater need to cope with
uncertainty. The research outlined in this proposal will facilitate
BCH's self-examination of its process of change and improve such
practices for continued survival.
8FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION
1. The character of BCH today is a reversal of the character
intended by the first Board of Trustees in 1865. At that time,
the "open door" was closed to persons who were not thought to be
honest workers temporarily beset by sickness. Compensation was
expected. Moreover, BCH was first designed to do the greatest
good to the greatest possible number. For that reason chronic
and incurable cases were not received into the wards.
Proceedings at the Dedication of the City Hospit'al, 1865, p. 7.
2. Proceedings at the Dedication of the City Hospital, 1965, p. 7.
9CHAPTER ONE
Sources of Deficits and the Problem of Uncertainty
Introduction
BCH has experienced growing deficits in the past few years. The
obligation of the hospital to accept indigent patients for care
subjects it to three major factors producing the deficits. These
factors are: 1) providing free care for unsponsored, indigent
patients; 2) rates of reimbursement not fully covering hospital
expenses, and; 3) the receipt of transferred patients who are not able
to pay for health care in private hospitals. These causes of BCH's
deficits will be discussed in more detail later. The amount of free
care demanded each fiscal year by patient populations can at best be
approximated. Given the enduring consequences of recent economic
troubles, it is reasonable to assume a steady demand for free care.
The new Massachusetts reimbursement law, changes in federal
policies impacting state resources and lessening the ability of Boston
to assist BCH exacerbate the uncertainties of service levels and
personnel. The degree of disequilibrium is greater now than before.
Thus the makeup of BCH's payor mix leading to massive free care,
patient transfers, and deficits are placed in a new and even more
important light by new cost containment legislation.
There are many inputs which cause deficits. I will examine the
trend of BCH's deficits since 1981 and its causes in Part A. In Part
B I discuss the problem of uncertainty.
10
A. DEFICITS
The balance sheet for the Department of Health and Hospitals
("DHH") for the year ending June 30, 1981 shows that BCH had total
assets of $120,362,464 (Attachment 1). Gross revenue from services
to patients totalled $92,752,334. After total deductions of
$9,511,585, which included write down of free care to cost basis
($4,173,226) and contractual allowance for free care net patient
revenue was $83,240,749. The accumulated defict for that year was
$46,225,587 (Attachment 2).
By 1983, BCH's assets totalled $107,396,996, a 12% decrease from
the 1981 level (Attachment 3). Gross revenues from patient services
total led $358,363,683 and after deductions net revenue was
$80,236,864. When compared with 1981, the gross revenues in 1983
increased by 74%. Even though gross patient revenues increased
substantially during the period, deductions were such that they caused
net patient revenue to fall by 3.7%. Furthermore, the ending deficit
for 1983 was $91,981,304, an increase of 49.7% over 1981. Given lower
assets, higher deficits and financial contingencies1 BCH's financial
position appears unstable. These deficits are produced, in part, by
BCH's payor mix, receipt of transferred patients and the general
consequences of Chapter 372. These major causes of deficits are more
fully discussed below.
1. The Payor Mix in BCH
Table One compares the sponsorship of patients in BCH with the
Massachusetts average.
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Table One
Sponsorship BCH State Average
Medicaid 25% 15%
Medicare 20% 35%
Bad debt/free care2  45% 5%
Blue Cross 7% 25%
Commercial Insurance 3% 20%
Source: "Understanding Massachusetts' New Hospital Law,"Staying
Alive!, February, 1983, p.6.
It is obvious that BCH sustains a disportionate percentage of bad
debt and free care. When compared other with other Boston hospitals,
BCH incurred $148 million in bad debt and free care in the 1983 fiscal
year. Other major Boston hospitals incurred only $67 million in bad
debt and free care--45% of BCH's total. 3
The history of this distorted distribution of free care and bad
debt is wel 1 documented. The aggregate free care and bad debt of
major Boston hospitals in 1981 was $53 million, compared to BCH's
$32.2 million. In 1982 the total dollar amount of free care and bad
debt incurred by other hospitals was $68.9 million while BCH incurred
$66.6 million.4  The populations receiving free health services, e.g.
the homeless or unsponsored, etc., are likely to increase. With the
tightening of eligibility levels and benefits package in
Massachusetts' Medicaid programs 5 and reductions in federal
contributions to public financing, more of Boston's citizens are
uninsured.
The homeless comprise many of the uninsured in Boston. This
12
population has grown as has the number of referrals from homeless
shelters to BCH. For example, the Pine Street Inn referred 453 people
from its Men's and Women's Clinics in the 1982 calendar year. But in
1983, 585 people were referred to the BCH emergency room and
outpatient clinic for health care. The rate of referrals to BCH from
Pine Street in 1983 rose 29% over the level in 1982.6 The need for
more shelters for the homeless and state-wide allocations of resources
to mitigate this problem further evidence the probability that
referrals from all shelters using BCH will increase. 7  The homeless
are but one population deemed "socially unacceptable" by the admitting
offices of private hospitals. And while BCH offers an alternative to
voluntary hospitals for treating drug addicts, alcoholics, and the
homeless, the restraints of Proposition 2 1/2 to raise taxes and
demands on local services further limits the resources the city of
Boston can offer BCH. 8
Most Boston hospitals serve patients with the ability to pay for
health care. These hospitals enjoy a somewhat wealthier clientele.
In light of this, new cost containment laws, namely Chapter 372,
creates financial incentive to transfer patients in order to avoid
unfavorable reimbursement.
Chapter 372 initiated a new era in Boston's health care system.
This legislation has unforeseen consequences and changes the behavior
of other Boston hospitals in a way that further burdens BCH. Chapter
372 is a landmark change in the hospital financing system that
inadvertently contributes to BCH's deficits. This law is discussed
below.
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2. Efforts to Contain Hospital Costs: The Creation of Chapter 372
Before Chapter 372 was created, Massachusetts' hospital costs
were about 30% above the national average. The increased costs were
passed to health consumers in the form of escalating insurance
premiums. Both Blue Cross and private insurance carriers raised their
rates 18-20% in 1982 to cover the increased charges made to them by
the hospitals. 9  The insurance industry felt it was fast approaching
the limit on how much it could continue to raise premiums without
pricing itself beyond the reach of many consumers. Chapter 372
established a new reimbursement system to "stabilize the financial
position of the insurance industry by limiting the amount hospitals
could increase their charges." 1 0
The costs to Massachusetts for rising Medicaid payments prompted
state officials to support Chapter 372 because it slows the rise in
Medicaid payments. This cost containment law can best be thought of
as a political compromise between various groups. However, advocates
for poor patients were excluded from this process.
Before Chapter 372, hospitals were paid for every service
provided. An increase in the volume of services increased a
hospital's revenue for that fiscal year. As hospital costs increased,
it could raise the amount it charged. Thus salary increases, new
equipment, and construction costs were passed onto its new rate.
Under Chapter 372 hospital budgets are fixed at pre-set levels.
Hospitals are free to spend the money allocated to them under this
system in any way they decide. The use of Maximum Allowable Cost
(MAC) in this system creates "financial incentives for discharging
patients earlier and keeping patients out of the hospital
14
altogether..."
Unlike the reimbursement system that preceeded Chapter 372,
Medicare and Medicaid will share the financial responsibility of
uninsured and underinsured patients. For BCH, if the number of
Medicaid, Medicare, and uninsured patients account for 68% or more of
its patient population, then Medicaid will pay a portion of its free
care. In BCH, where 45% of its patients have no insurance and where
10% are covered by insurance plans, the 68% provision should be
helpful. BCH administrators estimate that $15-$20 million in
guaranteed income will be generated by this law. But the realization
of this money is subject to uncertainty and further exacerbates the
fiscally-triggered contingencies BCH copes with. Since the law took
effect on October 1, 1982, reimbursement formula for free care and the
time such money can be received are vague. BCH is the only public,
acute care hospital in the Commonwealth to receive Medicaid money for
free care. But free care costs incurred in one year may not be
reimbursed until one or two fiscal yaers later. Thus matching the
level of services with fiscal resources is made more difficult.
Moreover, Chapter 372 has negative side effects which tamper with
BCH's deficits and increase uncertainty. The major side effect is the
referral of poor and Medicaid-funded patients from private hospitals
to BCH. Thus another cause of deficits is the "economic transfer" 1 2
of patients attempting to secure services in a private hospital but
referred to BCH because of their financial/insured status.
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3. Economic Transfer
It was not until Chapter 372 went into effect that reports of
economic transfers became common. This law encourages hospitals to
adjust their "payor mix" by reducing the care provided to unsponsored
patients. Cutbacks in Medicaid and Medicare have increased the number
of Massachusetts residents who carry no health insurance. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield estimates that 530,000 people in the Commonwealth
have not been insured since late 1982.13 Boston hospitals have
tightened their criteria for non-emergency care given to the
uninsured. 14  Until the financial incentives for transferring
hospitals to "dump" on BCH are corrected, patients requiring very
expensive treatment will be cared for at BCH. Direct refusal of care
and inappropriate referrals will undoubtedly continue.
However, deficits themselves are inputs to uncertainty. While
BCH has always faced uncertainty from some source, the current
uncertainty is capable of producing stress which could overwhelm BCH.
It is the formulation of uncertainty as a problem to which I now turn.
B. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY
Sources of financial drain have always existed for BCH. With the
passage of Proposition 2 1/2, changes in federal policies regarding
social programs and the implementation of Chapter 372 more indigent
patients are seeking care from BCH whose resources are decreasing.
This excess of demand over the supply of resources has lead to fiscal
shortages. These deficits have been a part of BCH's financial history
and they are part of its present. These deficits cause uncertainty as
to the level of health care and personnel that can be maintained. On
16
one hand, projected deficits for a fiscal year may prompt a service
department, such as Addicition Services, to reduce services and
personnel only slightly with additional cuts as needed. Reductions
are more gradual, occur in increments and are therefore less drastic.
On the other hand, the uncertainty caused by the impact of shifts in
reimbursement structures, behavior of other hospitals and decrease in
the economic strength of its catchment population may cause a drastic
reduction in services and personnel. Thus the difference between
deficits and uncertainty, lies in the severity of response in adapting
to perceived demand in light of decreasing and unsure sources of
money. Uncertainty forces BCH to assume as little risk as possible in
delivering care funded by doubtful money.
Thus a major ramification of uncertainty is that it causes
responses that are antithetical to providing care to persons in great
need. For example, from this author's interview with Deputy
Commissioner Robinson I learned that the uncertainty of the magnitude
of projected deficits resulted in reducing the six-month alcohol
rehabilitation program to twenty-eight days. Hiring of new personnel
for that program was stopped. The number of clients seen by the
remaining personnel, i.e., therapists, was increased. Addiction
Services reduced the training pre-requisites for some of its medical
personnel. Thus Licensed Practical Nurses ("LPNs") were substituted
in some instances for the higher trained Registered Nurses ("RNs").
The deficit-driven uncertainties of maintaining health care
levels and its providers translate at some point in how the needs of
the community are met and sustained. This translation is illustrated
17
by the fact that this department was forced into considering cuts in
programs successful in rehabilitating high-risk clients.
Deficit-produced uncertainty has two main implications. First,
it causes BCH to be reactive and not proactive. Unlike other Boston
hospitals, which can exercise more control over the environment
because of less uncertainty, BCH is vulnerable to the environment.
The environment crippled the implementation of a strategy for BCH to
improve its payor mix. A few years ago, deficit-induced uncertainty
prompted BCH to market itself in a way to attract more insured
patients. The marketing strategy included the construction of a $24
million facility. However, the impact of Proposition 2 1/2 on
Boston's resources destroyed this strategy. Second, the effectiveness
of long-term contingency planning is lessened.
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the main causes of BCH's deficits. It
discussed how uncertainty is a problem and provided examples of the
problem at the operational levels of one service department. In the
next chapter I pose questions as to how BCH can diagnose the change in
its coping with uncertainty.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER ONE
1. Notes to the combined statements for 1983 discuss two
contingencies which illustrate the uncertainty endemic to
monetary inputs to BCH. First, in 1982 and 1983 BCH received
overpayments from Medicaid outpatients in the amount of
$15,532,000. It is possible that the Department of Public
Welfare will seek recoupment of amounts in excess of the
limitations. If this occurs, the liability for BCH could be very
large.
Second, the reimbursement by Medicare and Medicaid for portions
of free care provided by BCH are not easily estimated. Under
Chapter 372, "[t]he determination of free care reimbursement
amounts is subject to uncertainties including the levels of free
care provided by other Massachusetts hospitals and the specifics
of formula application to Boston City Hospital." Notes to
Combined Financial Statements, Coopers and Lybrand, 1983,
footnote 20.
2. The distinction between bad debt and free care is often confused.
State income guides hold that if a person has the economic
resources to pay for heal th services, but refuses to do so, BCH
has incurred a bad debt expense. If the person receiving care
lacks such resources under the guidelines and could not pay, then
BCH has provided free care.
3. The other hospitals were: Beth Israel, Brigham and Women's,
Carney, Children's Medical Center, Faulkner, Massachusetts
General, New England Baptist, New England Deaconess, New England
Medical, St. Elizabeth's and University Hospitals.
4. Figures obtained from the tables of "Free Care and Bad Debt among
Major Boston Hospitals," The Boston Globe, February 6, 1984, p.
33; The Massachusetts Rate etting Commission and the individual
hospi tals.
5. Since 1980, between 18,000 and 20,000 Medicaid recipients in
Boston lost their eligibility. Interview with Barbara Gold,
Assistant to the Director of Community Health, BCH.
6. These statistics were provided by Ms. Barbara McInnes, the Public
Health Nurse at the Pine Street Inn.
7. See generally; McGerigle, Paul, More Than Shelter, United
Community Planning Corporation, 1983. This publication examines
the demand for more shelters and offers strategies for community
and governmental action in assisting the homeless.
8. Davis, Edith M. and Millman, Michael, L., Health Care for the
Urban Poor, (Rowman and Allanheld, New Jersey, 1983T, pp. 148-
191.
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9. CommonHeal th, "Understanding Massachusetts' New Hospital Law",
Staying Alive, February, 1983, p. 2.
10. Ibid .
11. Ibid, p. 3.
12. The referral of a patient to BCH deemed unable to pay for
services in a private hospital is currently termed an "economic
transfer". Such a referral is in the best economic interest of
the private institution. This situation is not new. As early as
1860, the Massachusetts General Hospital and other hospitals
denied admission to poor persons with incurable diseases. Gregg,
W.P., Document--No. 34, City of Boston Report of the Committee on
a Free City HospitWT 16,-p.7J4.These reasons prompted the
opening of BCH.
13. Who Cares for Those Who Cannot Pay? Greater Boston Hospitals and
the Issue of Economic Transfers, (Boston City Hospital Economic
Transfer Task Force, 1984), p. 1.
14. Both Tufts--New England Medical Center and Beth Israel have a
vague review process where non-emergency inpatient admission will
be provided to persons who evidence third-party coverage or who
make cash payment for the estimated bil1. Ibid, at page 1.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Research Issues
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the issue of how BCH detects
deficits, perceives the uncertainty arising from the deficits and
responds to the uncertainty. Moreover, this chapter focuses on the
process of detecting and responding to uncertainty and whether the
process has changed in relation to Chapter 372. To observe any change
in this process, two time periods will be reviewed and analyzed. The
time periods are pre Chapter 372 and post Chapter 372. The span of
time is roughly two years. It is necessary to structure the research
in this fashion to note any modification in the process and how and
why they came about. The detection of and response to uncertainty
prompts me to formulate the following issues of how BCH copes with
uncertainty.
1. The manner in which uncertainty is presented to BCH.
2. How the impact of uncertainty on BCH's operations is
perceived.
3. How BCH formally and informally detects uncertainty and
responds to it.
4. The process by which BCH evaluates and adapts its operations
to cope with uncertainty.
I. INPUTS TO EXAMINING UNCERTAINTY
I propose to look at these issues by examining data which are
inputs to BCH's process of adaptation. First, as I have suggested
that uncertainty emanates from deficits, it is necessary to know how
21
the deficits are produced. Thus the indigent patients served, rates
and methods of reimbursement and their contingencies should be known
for the two time periods I stated earlier. The causes of BCH's
deficits and any change in their composition lead me to formulate the
following inquiry.
Types of Patients Served by BCH
-- How many patients were sponsored by third-party payors (i.e.,
Medicaid, Medicare, Blue Cross, commercial) immediately before
Chapter 372 went into effect? How has this sponsorship changed
since then?
-- What percentage of BCH's patients received free care before
Chapter 372? After 372?
A second cause of deficits is the size of reimbursements for
patient care and the time lag when such payments can be realized as
revenue by BCH. There is often a discrepancy between the actual costs
BCH incurs to provide patient care and the allowable cost reimbursed
by third-party payors. The lag factor and the scale of reimbursements
prompt the following questions.
Reimbursement
-- What was the method and rate of reimbursement before Chapter
372? After Chapter 372?
-- How have the costs of providing services changed for BCH since
Chapter 372?
The research into the above questions may reveal that the size of the
potential deficit is a function of the interaction between the number
of patients, amount of reimbursements and the time reimbursements are
received.
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II. HOW INPUTS ON UNCERTAINTY ARE USED
Having examined the inputs BCH uses to examine deficits, I then
propose to analyze how the hospital handles these inputs. The inputs
relevant to deficits and its associated uncertainty are first
presented to BCH in the form of information. This information has a
number of different sources, such as the Mayor's Office, the
Department of Health and Hospitals, other hospitals, the community,
etc. Thus information on uncertainty must be filtered by BCH,
transformed into usable data, distributed to the departments and
interpreted by the persons in those departments. This process of
bringing data into BCH and transforming it as a prelude to detecting
and responding to uncertainty has three components. These components
are: 1) the information on deficits and uncertainty; 2) BCH's
perception of that information, and; 3) the structure in which data
gathering and perceptions are couched. These three elements are
crucial to understanding how the use of inputs in examining deficits
and reacting to uncertainty has changed since Chapter 372 was
implemented. However, before presenting the research questions on
those three components I will offer the rationale for selecting the
three units mentioned in the introduction. I have chosen three out of
eight departments in BCH which I feel fairly represent a wide range of
tasks and sensitivity to deficit-induced uncertainty. A description
of these three departments is contained in Attachment #4.1-3
I selected the Planning Office because it is a major point of
contact for BCH with community health centers, citizen groups, task
forces and the legislature. The Planning Office is, then, a crucial
23
point of receiving information from the world outside BCH. Aside from
its role as an information recipient, this office facilitates inter-
departmental efforts to improve the sharing of data.
Because the Planning Office was organized after Chapter 372, it
is possible that its mission was to reduce uncertainty. Lowering
deficit-induced uncertainty may result from anticipating the impact of
deficits on BCH's level of health care and its personnel. This may be
achieved by contingency planning. While this assertion is
speculative, it may be confirmed as the research is conducted.
The Fiscal Services department is the leading unit that detects
deficits and attempts to control the impact of deficits by reviewing
submissions of departmental budget requests, monitoring spending
patterns and requesting supplemental monies from Boston. Thus my
rationale for selecting Fiscal Services lies in its position on the
boundary between BCH and the parts of the Boston bureaucracy that
financially support the hospital.
I selected the Addiction Services department because it delivers
direct health care to the high-risk populations of the chemically-
dependent, the al coholics and the homeless. These populations are
causes of past and present deficits. It is this department where the
relationship between the indigent patients cared for and deficits is
very evident. My rationale for selecting Addiction Services is due to
its direct, continuous association with free care patients whose
medical needs demand substantial commitment of resources.
Of the eight responsibility centers in BCH, the Administrative
and Service units selected are a reasonable sample for researching the
change in coping with deficit-triggered uncertainty.
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BCH's perceptions of information are influenced by the
environment. Before I present the next set of questions in this
proposal, I will very briefly describe the external environment in
which BCH functions.
BCH is a small part of the Boston heal th care system where 15% of
the city's residents seek services. 4 The hospital is one of three
medical institutions in the Department of Health and Hospitals
("DHH"). However, 70% of the DHH budget is allocated to BCH each
fiscal year. 5 As an acute care municipal hospital, BCH depends on the
City of Boston and DHH. It must be cognizant of the demands from the
Federal government, the local community and accreditation agencies.
The external environment is dynamic and mandates careful attention
from BCH.
Draped over the intracacies of the world outside BCH is the
internal world of BCH. Eight units strive to perform professionally
specific tasks. The conflicting goals and polarized perceptions held
by some physicians and administrators in providing health care
frustrates delivery of services. At times this absence of
organizational cohesion causes BCH to function like a collection of
"little kingdoms". Given the expectations of the internal and
external environments, it is easy to see the complex interactions in
which BCH decisionmakers participate. This interaction leads me to
ask how information on deficits and uncertainty is gathered and viewed
by BCH.
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Information
-- How were data on deficits and the uncertainty it caused
collected from inside and outside BCH before Chapter 372?
After 372?
-- How are the data on uncertainty aggregated and then used in
policies? Has this changed since Chapter 372?
The Manner in which Uncertainty is Perceived
-- How does BCH define deficit-induced uncertainty? Has this
definition changed because of Chapter 372?
-- Does BCH perceive only potential deficits and not the
uncertainty that may arise from it? Did Chapter 372 alter this
perception?
-- If BCH perceived deficit-induced uncertainty, was it seen as a
problem before Chapter 372? After 372?
-- At any time before or after Chapter 372 went into effect, did
BCH see deficit-induced uncertainty as a threat to its
operations? If so, how?
-- How has the uncertainty impacted BCH's perception of its goals
since Chapter 372?
THE STRUCTURES OF BCH USED TO DETECT DEFICITS AND RESPOND TO UNCERTAINTY
Information is received into, filtered and disseminated by the
structures BCH has in place. Perceptions of deficits and the
contingencies linked with it are affected by these hierarchial
arrangments. The hospital's ability to adapt its coping mechanisms to
uncertainty is similarly impacted by these structures. The evolution
of these systems may partially explain the change in BCH's coping with
the doubt arising from deficits.
I have noted two types of structural arrangements in BCH. The
first one is formal. A formal structure results from required
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coordination of activities and interactions deemed necessary by BCH
for persons to perform. The second arrangment is informal. This
structure emerges from the activities and interactions among employees
to complete their jobs. These actions are neither required nor
prohibited by BCH, but simply evolve over time. 6 The major difference
between the formal and informal structures is that the former is an
attempt by BCH to control part of the work process. Deviating from
this could cause friction between the individual or department
involved and BCH. Informal structures are attempts by employees to
control work. Disrupting the process of these informal arrangements
may result in peer condemnation.
The interaction among formal and informal structures is rich.
Conflict between them may arise and solutions may be negotiated. I
hold that the structures are basic elements in detecting and
responding to deficit--triggered uncertainty. Table One presents the
types of structures and time periods which the pursuing group of
questions is concerned.
TABLE ONE: STRUCTURAL FACTORS
Pre Chapter 372 Post Chapter 372
Formal Structures .
Informal Structures
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-- What were the formal activities of the Addiction Services and
Fiscal departments before Chapter 372? After Chapter 372?
-- Did Chapter 372 change the formal activities of these
departments?
-- How do the Fiscal, Planning and Addiction Service departments
formally coordinate their inquiry of deficits and its potential
consequences? Has this process changed because of Chapter 372?
-- Was there a required function in each department to analyze
deficits and the contingencies they posed before Chapter 372?
After Chapter 372?
-- What informal arrangements existed within and across
departments to cope with deficit-triggered uncertainty before
Chapter 372? After Chapter 372?
-- Were informal arrangements centered around temporary problems
or were they more institutionalized before Chapter 372? After
Chapter 372?
III. THE ROLE OF DECISION-MAKING IN RESPONDING TO FISCALLY-INDUCED
UNCERTAINTY
In Part II I discussed formal and informal structures and
presented questions which would reveal their impact on the evolution
of BCH's adapting to uncertainty. Those structures provide the
background for decision-making. With the receipt, filtering and
transmission of information by these systems, options for responding
to uncertainty can be reviewed and consequences of each option
analyzed.
I am concerned with two forms of decisions. The research may
show how the scope of analysis and consideration of options under each
form may impact the quality of BCH's coping and adaptation abilities.
The first type of decision is comprehensive in the sense that multiple
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sources of data are synthesized, basic assumptions of operations
questioned and each consequence of responding to uncertainty is
carefully calculated. This mode of decision-making is demanding of
both intellectual and organization reserves. 7
A simplified mode of decision-making could be used by BCH in
responding to uncertainty. This type of process uses fewer data
inputs. Basic assumptions of operations are not questioned. The
consequences of each action in responding to uncertainty are not
considered in-depth. Gaps in the knowledge of deficits and their
impact are filled in by personal values, and beliefs. Thus a factual
premise is never divorced from the belief structures of the decision
makers.8
Decision-making in detecting deficits and responding to
uncertainty can only have an impact if communicated. Decisions may be
concealed or distributed as a source of information. Thus I have
further divided decisions into those that are either private or
public. A public decision is one that is communicated among the
departments. A private decision is one which is not shared with other
departments. Table Two presents the matrix of these types of decison-
making.
TABLE TWO: MATRIX OF DECISION-MAKING
Comprehensive Simplified
Private r
Public
29
The following questions are designed to obtain information on the role
of decisions in coping with deficit-prompted uncertainty.
-- Were all sources of information known to BCH on deficits and
the uncertainty they provoked examined before Chapter 372?
After 372?
-- How are the consequences of responding to uncertainty in
different ways calculated and evaluated? Did Chapter 372 alter
this?
--Are decisions concerning how the Fiscal, Planning, and
Addiction Service departments will respond to deficits and
uncertainty concealed within each unit? How has Chapter 372
affected the rate and quality of sharing decisions?
Earlier I mentioned the impact external and internal environments
have on the data used to detect fiscal shortages and react to
contingencies. The internal environment of BCH greatly affects the
frequency and quality of decisions. The freedom to make operational
changes and the socialization of new persons to the decision-making
process may be restricted. Thus the manner in which BCH feels it
should react to uncertainty may be quite different from what actually
happens.
Decisions are the building blocks in BCH's coping and adaptation
system. It is important for the three departments to understand how
traits endogenous to BCH may lessen the potency of decisions.
Researching the following questions will provide insight into the
quality of the hospital's inquiry of its response to deficits and
uncertainty before and after Chapter 372.
-- To what extent do the departments exercise discretion in
deciding how to cope with uncertainty? What impact did Chapter
372 have on this?
-- What is the turnover of departmental personnel since Chapter
372 was implemented?
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-- Are new persons encouraged to participate in the decisions on
how to detect deficits and cope with uncertainty? Did Chapter
372 affect this?
-- Do different perceptions on uncertainty prevent full disclosure
of decisions among departments?
-- Did Chapter 372 prompt BCH to establish precedent on how to
cope with uncertainty?
-- What was the role of the executive staff in detecting deficits
and responding to uncertainty before Chapter 372? Has their
role in this process changed because of Chapter 372?
After researching these questions sufficient data should exist to
conclude if:
a) the operations in the Fiscal, Planning and Addiction Services
departments are different now than before Chapter 372;
b) if any change in operations is a direct result of BHC's
adapting to and coping with deficit-provoked uncertainty.
This research will also indicate whether learnig on the part of BCH
has increased through BCH's changing the manner in which it copes with
deficit-driven uncertainty.9
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER TWO
1. Interview with Mr. Bruce Rosen, Assistant to the Vice President
of Planning, BCH.
2. Interview with Mr. Harry Powers, Accountant, BCH.
3. Interview with Mr. Paul Robinson, Deputy Commissioner of
Addiction Services, BCH.
4. Interview with Mr. Richard Segan, Director of Community Health at
BCH.
5. Ibid.
6. For a more detailed discusision on formal and informal work
groups, See: Athos, Anthony and Barrett, Diana, Note on Stable
Work Groups, Harvard Business School, 1974, pp. 1-35.
7. Theorists have referred to this comprehensive form of decision-
making as analytic. The analytic paradigm of decison-making
assumes an elaborate mechanism of decomposing problems involving
values, uncertainty, and the coordination of many actors. Within
this paradigm, competing values are balanced and alternative
outcomes calculated. Arising from analytic decision-making is
causal learning--the inclusion of overlooked environmental
elements for consistent consideration by the decision-maker.
Steinbruner, John, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton
Uni versi ty Press, 194, pp. 1-140.
8. This simple decision-making process is termed cybernetic by John
Steinbruner. The cybernetic paradigm assumes a less elaborate
decison-making mechanism. A short-cycle information feedback
loop avoids calculating outcomes. Stability is maintained by:(1) a narrow emphasis on subsets of the environment; and (2)
minimal articulation of values. Cybernetic decision-making
depends upon a regular and simple environment, where uncertainty
is assumed, information is received only through established
channels and employees are constrained by organizational
precedent when faced with new problems. Decisions are short
range and learning is slower and more sporadic. Ibid.
9. Research of this sort has helped executives analyze their
learning process as it relates to organizational activity. For
the past 10 years, the Norwegian Center for Organizational
Learning has helped about 1000 executives discover their learning
processes. The requirements for executives learning about their
organizations are: (1) an interest in what is learned; (2)
awareness of consequences if such learning does not take place;(3) willingness to make one's behavior part of the inquiry.
Similar requirements are needed for BCH.
Three assumptions are embedded in this chapter. First, that
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persons in BCH are not aware of learning as a major influence on
their work situation. Secondly, only by seeing the connection
between behaviors and consequences will BCH personnel be in a
position to change their behavior. Thirdly, change will not
occur unless it is actively pursued. See: Knudsen, Kjell,
"Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Learning Through the Use
of Experimental Simulation and Process Analysis", Vol. 3 Journal
of Experimental Learning and Simulation, No. 3-4, 1981, pp. 129-
131.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Methodology
Approach
The approach of this methodology is to have a consultant
facilitate the self-diagnosis of the three selected departments. In
the role as facilitator, the consultant will hold regular meetings
with each department to jointly define the problem of uncertainty and
modify the definition as needed. Self-diagnosis is important as a
means to analyze the process of coping with and adapting to
uncertainty. Furthermore, self-diagnosis will play a key part in
understanding the organizational behaviors and systems that lead to
particular responses to uncertainty. The consul tant wi11 use the case
of the Addiction Services' response to uncertainty as a means of
exploring the other departments' perceptions of how uncertainty
impacts them. The concerns emanating from uncertainty such as reduced
access to health care, lowered program effectiveness and a change in
the nature of BCH will be explored. Each department will be
encouraged to engage in this research by discussing the problems
uncertainty has caused their operations. During the process other
cases will develop and will be used for futher exploration.
Methodology
The methodology is concerned with collecting data for two time
periods. In order to reconstruct departmental coping strategies in
place before Chapter 372, documents will be reviewed and oral
interviews conducted. This type of reconstruction will require the
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consultant to synthesize multiple views of former attempts to cope
with uncertainty. The same process of information gathering will be
used for the post Chapter 372 period. The manner in which these data
will be compiled is further explained below. Due to the interference
this research may introduce the amount of time will be negotiated with
BCH to insure minimum interruption of operations.
Introduction to the Problem
The initial meeting of the three departments will take place with
the consul tant. At this meeting, the consultant will encourage a
joint aetinition of the problem of uncertainty as perceived by the
departments. In subsequent meetings data which are common to the
three departments will be shared. Documents containing pre and post
Chapter 372 descriptions of patient sponsorship and deficits will be
used. The departments may similarly share information the evolution
of their informal structures and interdepartmental networks. After
this, the Planning, Fiscal, and Addiction Services departments will
separate and engage in team analysis.
Specific Framework for Each Department
The departments shall select a team leader. This person will be
responsible for coordinating the department's analysis of its
definition of and reaction to uncertainty. The consultant will meet
with each team to facilitate the process. Each department should then
explore its perceptions of uncertainty and the change in behavior and
operations emanating from it. The following steps should be
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undertaken.
A. Personal Description
First, each member should complete a questionniare prepared by
the consultant on how uncertainty modified the way he performs his
job. Information not received from the questionnaire may be gleaned
by reviewing the department's policy directives.
B. Sharing
Second, all of the questionnaire's answers will be shared and
discussed by the team. Further elaboration and clarification will be
given as needed.
C. Interviews
Many coping strategies will not be committed to written form.
Thus interviews must be conducted. The consultant shall interview the
team leader alone. In turn, the consultant shall interview the other
members individually. These interviews will be tape recorded for
future reference by the consultant in drawing his conclusions.
The aim of the interviews is to uncover individual hypothesis
about the consequences of uncertainty on members' behavior and expand
on the questionnaire.
Conclusion
Until this point in the research, each department has diagnosed
its own goal s, information flows, and decision making as they teach
interact and impact BCH's anticipation of deficits and response to
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uncertainty. After amassing a myriad of impressions on the problem
through written and oral data, the departments will meet again. The
teams will engage in joint analysis to ascertain how individual
behavior culminated in departmental strategies to cope with
uncertainty.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusion
This proposal suggested questions to guide BCH's diagnosis of
whether its way of coping with uncertainty has changed because of
Chapter 372. This research will make BCH more conscious of its
decison-making patterns, formal and informal structures and
information networks. The knowledge gained form this analysis, I
feel, will have three positive impacts for BCH.
First, perceptions of fiscal ly-produced uncertainty will be
shared among the departments in BCH. From initial interviews by the
author with department personnel it was felt that patient service
units and the administrative departments had little interdependence.
A minimum of integrating and coordinating decisions was also sensed.
Thus the BCH is often perceived as a hospital of "little kingdoms"
each trying to expand their power in acceptable ways. The process of
self-analysis may affect the degree and quality of problem solving
among the Fiscal, Planning and Addiction Services departments.
Second, acknowledging and comprehending the problem of
uncertainty may initiate new ways to cope. In search of more
effective coping strategies, the Fiscal, Planning and Addiction
Services departments may experiment with their operations. Strategies
that are ineffective in dealing with uncertainty can be more easily
discarded.
Third, the need for greater certainty may prompt BCH to negotiate
with aspects of the external environments on which it depends. More
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aggressive adaptation may be undertaken. For example, the House
Officers Association ("HOA") may propose legislation to more equitably
distribute the care of the indigent among all Boston hospitals. BCH
would then be more proactive in its approach to the problem of free
care.
Because Chapter 372 hQs existed since 1982, BCH's coping
strategies in place before the law may still be in use. Any change
may be gradual and this research may tap into this change as it is
occurring. If this is the case, the questions in Chapter Two would
serve to heighten the quality of analyzing present coping abilities.
Reconstructing past ways of detecting deficits and responding to
uncertainty through oral interviews, questionnaires and policy review
is not perfect. The memories of personnel may be fallible. Written
documents may not give needed insight into the compromises leading to
final decisions. The turnover of personnel after Chapter 372 will
disrupt the flow of information and perceptions around uncertainty.
Any changes in coping with uncertainty may be abated by
political, structural, and regulatory constraints. BCH must consider
the demands of its unions, the Civil Service, and the hospital's place
in Boston's budgetary system. Yet these constraints should not
diminish the opportunity BCH decision-makers have to engage in a self-
diagnostic process to see how each one alone and together influence
their ability to endure uncertainty.
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APPENDIX
Organizational Learning
Introduction
This appendix addresses the concept of organizational learning--a
process which enriches BCH's knowledge and enables it to adapt its
operations to uncertainty. Because BCH learns through its individual
members a brief description of the theory of individual learning is
presented first. Next, the frictions prompting organizational
learning are discussed. Types of learning are contrasted. Different
models of organizational learning have been proposed by organization
theorists. Significant models are described and a model applicable to
BCH is fashioned as the premise for the research questions and
methodology in Chapters two and three respectively.
Individual Learning
BCH is composed of people who learn various functions in
differing degrees. Learning in and of itself mandates the acquisition
of knowledge.1 New knowledge as part of learning is also the practice
of new methodologies, new skills and new attitudes and values.
Learning at the personal level is, then, the process of preparing to
deal with new situations.2  Dealing with new situations requires the
flexibility to learn how to learn, to thoughtfully transfer knowledge
from problem to problem. 3 As a person's experience grows, responding
to changes becomes easier and solutions are arrived at not so much by
trial and error but by insight.4 Thus experience plays a very
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important role in learning. Through experience and the building of
competence problems of a more complex nature may be attacked.
When individuals work together to achieve goals, imbalances and
disorder over fixed procedures are likely to occur. The stress from
the imbalance is of concern to the organization. Adapting to this
stress requires learning on the part of an organization's subsystems
(i.e. departments) and the total system.
The Impetus for Learning
Learning occurs in three organizational levels: 1) units; 2) the
entire organization; and 3) interaction between the units and the
whole workplace. Discomfort stress and performance stress result from
environmental complexities and their uncertainty, which overload
limited resources. 5  Excessive demands frustrate workers to the point
that the threat of failure is quite real. Individual learning as part
of adaptation occurs to ameliorate this stress placed on the worker.
Organizations are subject not only to performance stress, but to
disjunctive stress. This stress is created by the conflict arising
when individuals and subgroups behave divergently. "When individual
and subgroup adaptation produce divergence and conflict beyond what
the organization can tolerate, total-system learning is likely to take
place." 6  If the tasks of departments are poorly coordinated, services
may be severely impeded. Learning improves the quality of
coordination.
When financial difficulties are not addressed by scrutinized,
definite and reliable procedures, such uncertainty may act as a
catalyst for organizational learning. 7 Moreover, the difficulties BCH
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now faces in fund shortages, fal 1 ing net revenues, etc. provide the
need to re-examine current policies.8
Major Forms of Learning
As organizational learning may occur at different levels, the
type of learning may similarly differ. The type of learning which may
explain the strong tendency to protect the status quo is maintenance
learning. 9 Persons engaging in maintenance learning are concerned
with applying rules and a static outlook to known or recurring
situations. Values are given to the decision-maker by the
organization that employs him. Excluding values which are not
inherent in the organizational structure cripples the decision-maker's
ability to act on unfamiliar situations.10
However, innovative learning provides for the smoothing over of
incongruent values. This form of learning recognizes "the existence
of a multiple and flexible system of values that is under a myriad of
pressures for change." 1 1  Thus values are not stagnant. Rather they
allow decision-makers to choose between courses of action and
strategies. In times of turbulence, discontinuity or uncertainty,
innovative learning initiates the reformulation of problems. 1 2
The two main features of innovative learning are anticipation and
participation. Anticipation consists of preparing for possible
contingencies and long-range future alternatives. 13  Participation is
the active involvement of persons in the process. Innovative learning
is more demanding than maintenance learning. To engage in innovative
learning, conventional assumptions must be questioned, problems
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formulated and the range of options enlarged. The need for the
Fiscal, Addiction and Planning departments to cope with fiscally-
induced uncertainty mandates innovative learning. It is this form of
collective inquiry that serves as a "means of preparing
individuals..to act in concert in new solutions..." 14
Theorists have modeled organizational learning in various ways.
In most of the models examined, the role of interaction, either
interpersonal, individual organizational or organizational
environmental is evident. A summary of these models follows.
Hedberg's Model
Hedberg notes the omission in current literature about whether
organizations learn in their own right or if organizations learn and
remember through current members. Referring to the model in Figure 1
below, Hedberg states that organizational learning is the interaction
between an individual and the organization. Individuals act and learn
from acting, but "organizations are the stages where acting takes
place." 1 5  For Hedberg, organizational learning involves discarding
obsolete knowledge and manipulating and enacting a changing
environment. 16
Figure 1: The Cycle of Organizational Learning 17
Individual action Individual beliefs
Organizational action Environmental response
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"Organizational learning includes both the processes by which
organizations adjust themselves defensively to reality and the process
by which knowledge is used offensively to improve the fit between
organizations and their environments." 1 8 Thus an organization which
is threatened by environmental discontinuity may unlearn old behavior
and learn new behavior.
The learning of BCH is not the total of the learning of its
employees. The departure of persons results many times in the
subtraction of their knowledge from BCH. Their learning would remain
for BCH if it were committed to written policies or memoranda or
otherwise shared with remaining employees. 19
At the organizational level, theories of action, 2 0 myths and
sagas parallel an individual's cognitive structure. These provide a
perceptual filter to select stimuli from numerous data. So while the
City of Boston provides material on deficits, they become meaningful
for BCH when these data are fil tered. 2 1
When an organizational learning cycle is complete, one of three
modes of learning may be used to adjust to change. With minor changes
in the environment, the organization employs adjustment learning,
where certain response repertoires are negotiated with the
environment. 2 2  Turnover learning occurs when significant,
irreversible and partial changes prompt an organization to unlearn old
behavior.2 3 When an organization is faced with substantial
environmental changes, turnaround learning demands complete
restructuring of responses.
When the relationship between an organization and its environment
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is unclear, the links in the learning cycle may be severed. Such
ambiguity may cause faulty understanding of reality and invalid
strategies for coping with change. 2 4 Complex, hostile environments2 5
may contribute to ambiguity and confusion as well as overloading
information--processing capacities.
Hedberg notes that a crucial part of organizational learning is
unlearning. "Organizational unlearning is typically problem-
triggered. Fund shortages, falling revenues...are some examples.
These triggers cause hesitancy and build up distrust in procedures...A
turbulent period then frequently follows." 2 6 During unlearning,
established perceptions, responses to stimuli and reactions to new
situations are jettisoned. Keeping in mind the previous discussion,
one may model organizational learning as learning, leading to
unlearning and needed relearning for continued survival. The result
of this process is to embellish an organization's flexibility by
discovering continuities in its environment.
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Kolb's Model
Kolb stresses the role of experience in organizational learning.
Figure 2 displays his experimental learning model.
CON
Execution
* committing
TESTING IMPLICATIONS resources
OF CONCEPTS IN NEW * creating
SITUATIONS solutions
,RETE
Convergence
* testing theories
* solving problems
EXPERIENCE
Divergence
* generating alter- OBSERVATIONS AND
native- REFLECTIONS
* recognizing
problems
Assimilation
* formulating theories
* defining problems
FORMATION OF ABSTRACT CONCEPTS
AND GENERALIZATIONS
Figure 2: Kolb's Experiential Learning Model 27
He proposes this model to help managers enhance the
organization's ability to learn. As one follows the clockwise
direction of the model, "one moves in varying degrees from actor to
observer, from specific involvement to general analytic detachment." 28
The success of implementing this model depends upon individual
learning styles.2 9 The combination of these styles greatly impacts
the quality of learning the specifics of a particular subject and
learning how to learn from experience. 3 0
Kolb states that an organization will differentiate itself into
i
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units to respond to segments of the external environment. And while
organizational differentiation may be "the difference in cognitive and
emotional orientation among managers in different functional
depar'tments" 3 1 such differences may distort organizational learning.
Kolb suggests that as learning is actively pursued, different
perspectives should be tolerated. 3 2 Such toleration will, he feels,
prevent the dominance of one organizational unit over the others.
Kolb's experiential learning model has been used to assist individuals
in identifying learning styles.33 As managers at Procter and Gamble
learned more about the model, they developed an appreciation of the
contributions of the other members of the group. Working
relationships improved. The participants concluded that "[t]o the
extent that...social and political turbulence is forcing even the most
stable organizations...to adopt a learning orientation--if they are to
survive, we expect the Learning Model to be increasingly useful." 3 4
Dery
David Dery contributes the notion of error as absolutely
essential to organizational learning. 3 5 An error is an unexpected
outcome--a mismatch of outcomes to expectations. The factors leading
to errors are the internal communication network which determines how
data are converted into information. Thus interpretation of data is
bound by organizational premise and the employee's role. 3 6  The
conversion of data are influenced by the organization's factual and
value premises.
To recognize error, the organization must first define what it
would perceive as error. Having accomplished this, "the learning task
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of an organization is thus interpreted as the need to move from one
set of premises to a competing set of premises, yet on the basis of
the previ.ous set." 3 7 The shift in premises depends on the elements in
the environment the organization selects as its frame of reference.
The frame of reference may be either political or substantive.3 8 With
knowledge of its organizational premises, grounds for recognizing
error and interdepartmental networks, BCH may be able "to pose certain
questions to the environment and adopt behavior on the basis of
experience."39
Shrivastava's Typology of Learning Systems
This author summarizes various descriptions of organizational
learning which are useful for this appendix. 4 0  Organizational
learning has been defined as adapting goals and rules on the basis of
experience to meet environmental demands. "In short, organizational
learning is a function of the organization's experience with the
knowledge base that underlies decision processes." 4 1 Learning in
organizations is gradual and moderated by intra-organizational
conflicts and procedures. 42
Drawing upon the work of Schon and Argyris, organizational
learning has been viewed as the sharing of assumptions, where errors
are detected to maintain the present mode of operation. When an
organization's operations (theory-in use) change as the result of
individual and collective inquiry, learning is said to have
occurred. 4 3 When the values and norms embedded in the operations
remain constant after an inquiry, single-loop learning has occurred.
If the values and norms of the operations have been restructured,
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double-loop learning has taken place. 4 4
Borrowing from the work of Duncan and Weiss, Shrivastava notes
that organizational learning is the development of a knowledge base
where the relationship between actions and outcomes is known. 4 5 In
other words, the people engaged in coordinated activities to secure
outputs realize the impact of external forces on what they do.
Learning Systems
The work of Shrivastava is important to this research proposal
because it sets forth the concept of learning systems. Without
learning systems, learning would not be perpetuated and
institutionalized in BCH. A learning system takes note of the many
contexts in which organizational learning occurs. Figure 3 presents
the characteristics and types of learning systems most relevant to
BCH.
Figure 3: Characteristics of Organizational Learning Systems 46
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The different learning systems represent ideal systems. However,
BCH contains a mixture of these systems due to its formal and informal
structures, communication networks and bureaucractic flavor. The
learning systems in BCH vary in explicitness, systematization,
formality and sophistication. But each system acquires and interprets
knowledge relevant for decison-makin.g in BCH. These systems are
rooted in the practices of BCH. Even though these systems may not be
verbalized or documented, persons in BCH have at least an intuitive
sense of their existence.
Organizational Learning and BCH
The concept and application of organizational learning presents a
challenge to BCH. The goal of this proposal stated at the outset is,
in effect, to make BCH an organization that learns how to learn 47 from
reviewing its methods of coping with uncertainty by self-diagnosis.
Deutero-learning demands an effective, shared inquiry to integrate
diverse perceptions of BCH phenomena; to test interpretations of these
phenomena to create new policies, and to respond to conflicts through
inquiry.
The benefits of deutero-learning lie in the increased
effectiveness resulting from public testing of operations, values,
information and a high freedom of choice, internal commitment and risk
taking. Such learning reverses the private or self-sealing mode of
learning that inevitably decreases effectiveness.4 8 The concept of
deutero-learning should assist BCH in coping with future problems
similar to those addressed in this proposal.
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FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX
1. It is knowledge which enables an employee to complete
successfully a class of work tasks. Moreover, knowledge "is that
inferred capability which makes possible the successful
performance...that could not be performed before the learning was
undertaken." Gagne, Robert "The Acquisition of Knowledge," Vol.
69 Psychological Review, No. 4, 1962, p. 355.
2. Botkin, James W. No Limits to Learning, Pergammon Press, 1979, p.
8.
3. Harlow, Harry "The Formation of Learning Sets," Vol. 56,
Psychological Review, 1949, p. 53.
4. Trial-and-error and insight are points on a continuum. Both
approaches strive to realize perceived goals. Trial-and-error
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error and insight lies gradual analysis, a series of analytic
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abrupt change from relatively random to directed behavior. This
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8. Ibid.
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10. The content of organizational communication, such as job
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ATTACHMENT ONE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1981
Pg'. 1
DEPARTMENT Of HE/.LTH & HOSPITALS
BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30. 1981
MATTAPAN
ASSETS
Cash - Checking A/C 6 Petty Cash
Cash - Salary Advance
Cash & Canh EquivalentR
A/R
A/R
A /R
A/R
A/R
Due
Due
Due
Due
Billed - Inpatient
Unbilled - Inpatient
- Out pat i ent
- Alcohol Ic Rehb.
- Allowant e Vor Dou)tfil Accounts
From
From
From
From
FTom
3rd
3rd
3rd
3 r,1I
3rd
Part Ies
Part les
Part Ief
Pa I t I e'
aIt Ies
,f rt T e
Ir .i ir I
tu, Frnm Ird lt! Ite
0 tie
Due
F om
Frm ur
I r !
1 rd
3rd
1at -L I
Pfar les
,ettlements - 1980 Blue Cross
Settlciwnts - 1981 Medicare
Settlements - 1981 Blue Cross
Anpoal - 1980 Pension (Choate Hall)
Apioal, - 1981 Pension (Choate Hall)
A aI As You Go Payment (Difference
t'1ween Provision & Funding) 1980
A-; You Go Payment (Difference
t. !(I Provision & Funding) 1981
& Workmens Comp. - 65%
I! I '1 ModicatId
A " - 1)80 Medicaid
A a I s - i98l Medicaid
Apials I- 1979 Medicare
$ 8,320
6,459
$ 14,779
977,519
562,320
5,181
(378,629)
(164,599)
58,860
(170,772)
320,149
313,174
206.244
148,650
58,045
(433.636)
(375,565)
(138,869)
LONG ISLAND
$ 56.896
6,023
$ 62,919
1,334,779
376.007
5,415
(376,517)
(89,895)
101,563
(81,524)
465,323
382,686
288,743
208,110
81,263
9,758
1,736
166.622
B.C.H.
$ 127,294
30,611
$ 157,905
11,998,532
28,525,368
11,463,514
(28,600,000)
782,569
491.928
1,567,.4
1,129,738
'48, Io'
337,327
75,509
S ii. ,510
S 235.,03
29, 3 5
(29, . .
(254,494)
942 .j92
(252,296)
'C.
I ~. *i*
U1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS
BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1981
MATTAPAN
ASSETS (Cont.)
Due From 3:d Partics - Appeals 1980 Medicare
Due Fro'm 3rd Parties - Appeals - 1981 Medicare
A/R - Interest
A/R - Social Disease
A/R - Nursing Tuition
AIR - Cat Scans
AIR - Salary Advance
AIR - Settlement Suspenve
Conse rv a t Isrm
Accounts 1,eivabl
15n " t aI Stf
Dht i y v
Ph., maay c
Uth r W ithh ld ng P t tu
Ai outnt S
Accrued Salarien 4 igen
Due From rity if B n
$
1,023
(52,313)
10,512
$ 947,294
26,811
5,578
62,390
_ 
9 779
(1 3,320)
37.040
27,415
416,718
122,332
$ 590,185
LONG ISLAND
$ -
2,514
(70,458)
(90, 387)
$ 2,715,/38
59,061
10,649
107,226
Q 11b,936
(64,896)
61,254
39,079
283,983
190,090
$ 509.510
B. C. H.
$ 461,412
122,566
8,604
39.444
13,904
7,162
1,505,969
(350,951)
$ 30,569, 365
421 .266
15, 56
384,489
(1 5? ,) 9
406,275
202, 185
6,787,21.
1,248,550
$ 8,486.31;
TO rAl.
5 461.41?
122.'>Th
13.90L
1,162
3,537
1,383,198
~ 554 - '
- -i
Uf.
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Pg. 3
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS
BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1981
MATTAPAN
ASSETS (Cont.)
Cur reit Assets
Due From Trust ees
L.and
Land Improveme7nts
Building & Improvem eur
Equipment
Accumulated D,:prec.iati y - L.iand Improvements
Accumulit ed Dp rec i it o - Ho ildings & Improvements
Accumulated DePrer;it or. - fgotpment
$ 1,647.037
65,000
122,257
6,102,034
757,253
(105.138)
(4.168,336)
(474,658)
$ 2,298,412
Tr Al. A. I '
LONG ISLAND
$ 3,465,103
146,100
3,013,896
8,443,342
1,069,335
(2,213,659)
(4,625,550)
(637,774)
$ 5,195,690
.i ',',/3
B.C.H.
$ 40,034,909
1,824,950
487,341
77.655
103.037, 460
12,417,295
(49,566)
(32,196,694)
(5 , ,,
7 8, 502>
TO A
45 3.J
3,21 3,
(2,.3685 ,h3)
(40. '0,
-I
Property, Planlt anld ui nt
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS
BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1981
MATTAPAN
LIAB.ITIES
Accounts Pa:yalie
Advances From Iept. of Public Welfare
$ 416,718
122,332
132,263
184.458
Accruedl S.laries & Wig,
Accrued Sick Pav
Accrued Va<cation Pav
Meal Tax
Tax W ithhol ing
Other Withholding
Accrued Initer, st
Blue Cross W-'rking Ci Ital
Refunds in Process
Accrued Liabil ities
.trrenit L I i lit
Acrued Judge-nt '
Accrued Pet irs . or .t .
TOTrAl. i.1Ai i1. I .'sI
37,040
27,415
$ 503,508
$ 920,226
$ 2,721,770
$ 3,b41,996
S i .'-12 . 664
$(5,625,575)
$ 1,887,089
$ 5,529,085
Accumulated let i1i!!
Ac L i I a t u d 1 i -
Total Fund r 1
rtFA1 1. IA'; !. 1! : m
LONG ISLAND
$ 283,983
190,090
157,540
291,294
-61.254
39,079
$ 739,257
$ 1,023,240
$ 3,810,478
$ 4,833,718
S (11,178.709)
$ 3,174,543
$ 8,008,261
B. C. H.
$ 6,.787.' -
3L000, 000
1,248,550
1,270,000
1,507, 78
(290)
406 2 75
202,1825
729, 756
265,000
11,395
$ 5,640,049
$_ 15,427 61
$ 21 , 5
$ 37, 796, 3b
$ (44,264,
$ 81,635 .
$ 119,431, 3 )
1,5Sn0, 12
1,,33
3 , 0)b
9,
I , 9
S 6,'.
17,
S 46. 2 7 1
(6
00
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ATTACHMENT TWO
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
JUNE 30, 1981
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN
GROSS REVL-.NU FRO" .Vih TO PATIENrs:
Room &. Care
Special Service
Clinics
Gross Revenue From Servico-i *o Patients
DI'UCIONS FROM GRO: \ .i RFUENUES:
ipar tlent B1 . -:
Wr ite Dw- if Free C i. to Cost Ba sis
Write Oft Balance of I Medicare AFS (AFS-3)
Increase APS Liability to 1980 Blue. Cross (AFS-4)
Write Off Unadjusted Ii1ance of. 1979 Medicare AFS (AFS-6)
Adjust Prior Ye,'.r Appeal% ro Proper Levels at 6/30/81 (AFS-8)
R.. .,,I L.Th 0 . t .n Weltare Settlements and Write Off
n A M i ; . (AFS- 9)
~* .- d 1 A h H .. lfare Retro Rate Adj. (AFS-10)
: , . .d , n ion Exp. for 1981 Welafre
* : Al . A - I
. d A S I i: t '1 R t-;ed on B/C Audit Retro
. - I. i ' I "A Il'n t alid Write
ir: .aolja Al tii t i . Al. (A S--14)
R..rd, I el n Wt,'If(e SeJ tlement.s and Write
Y: 1n11 A ' ; I i . Ad . ( AlS- 15)
.- r . l ' . . I- 't l~Fv ept iin f ron 19 0 Coist Re por
$ 14,236,090
63,854
$ 14,299,944
$ -4,741,894
29,953
74,802
16,660
(313,174)
LONG ISLAND
$ 22,446,841
107,205
$ 22,554,046
$ 10,392,446
(53,085)
26,498
7,683
(5,151)
(153,611)
(382,686)
L(AFS-i6) --
B.C. H.
$ 31,470,006
39,691,200
21,591,128
$ 92,752,334
$ 4,208,085
4,173,226
780,139
(38,051)
957,924
COIL.1\ i Y
- S 68,
- 39. 2,
- S 129,60o
- S 19
Ii
9~2, 773
(122,566)
(491,928)
(483, 10'>)
(468,721)
( 137,hl)
01
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
Doi I ON,; F ~ pi l.)5 VA, i9 N n co t.
Establish AFS Rel.ited to Fundted Pension Exp. for 1980 Welfare
Rate Adj. (AFS-17)
Reserve Fully t er 198 P n mn Related Rate Adj. (AFS-18)
Re:erve Fully for 1080 Wtl ire Rate Adj. (ASF-19)
Reserve Avin .f the : t a Welfare Rate Increase (ASF-20)
Reserve Agzainst A-S foir ulfare Retro Rate Adj. (AFS-21)
R.'erve 1980 rd .re nu:ine 223 Cost Exception (AFS-22)
R, ord AFS n 19 r nm I sues (AFS-23)
Record an All aince A ,. :nst V981 AFS
Provide 65% Re imurn'ar 'nt for W/C & Unemployment (AJE-35)
Accrue for Rece'ivable! trom 3rd Parties - Legal Letter from
Choate Hall (A IF-31
Aciruc hi Pary,' Bon" t :,; Fetvable for Difference between
n At
"r t o Fr -.
I. -
$ (320,149)
313,174
320.149
(58,045)
(633,212)
(354,894)
$ 3,817,158
$ 1 ,426,4 63
(1,355, 140)
$ 71,J2
$ 3,88_8,481
S I0,411,463
$ (465,323)
382,686
465,323
(81,263)
(847,860)
(496,853)
$ 8,788,804
$ 1,98 .'.
(91,88,242)
S 99),)i i
$ ii,88/;,I1/
$_13,ih66,.29
* i'i*~-.ii*; I
S - $
it Hr 1
I It rena. y
S -
491 928
12,566
97,000
20,000
(690,696)
301,000
(441,142)
(491.928)
(2,697,202)
$ 4,6,02,207
S 32. .>
(27, r ,,U5)
$ 9,>11.'-8'
S 83, 2 ,,749
$ 2'4 .403
I *.,18
- 2
B. C. 1.
I -
(1,9, 1
(3,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
$Mobile canteei
T.B. Bureau
Security - parking . ID's
Space Rental - Mallory
Miscel Imeous
Trustees 0/H
1.abora tor y
Intere,;t
Social Disease
Nursing Tuiti'n
BURC
Space Rent al - Ti u- t
sp we Rt' -l
5Iidy R onitt.
I.u'tnr 1-
$
1,306
,143,174
$ 143,174
$10,554.637
$ , 30i)
$ 36,012
259,310
991
281,000
(11,35~)
751 202
52.689
163, 325
45,322
226.979
45,322
50.999
S , lb ,.
$ 85,t06,:u;
198 han o ~ cr .-r llVac.oi -i -. & Sick Pay
S 5,464, 048
19.903
(2J4, 296)
$ 8,.l9
99,596
(2t60,0I )
$ SI (. ,im)
(45, *712)
(5,04.1,888)
B.C. H.
COM ill n(.l1-H01I~Ir
C ,.
N)
- 3 
-
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
PATIENr SE-RVICYS i-Kl-aN:ln-.
S2il .. .s t - Repiar Employees (cont.)
Add'l Alloat tI. : 1 -. loalth - Overhead P/R Items
1981 Trustees Ept
airies & Wag. -('A E-vlay loce.s
1981 Cash Exp:<1dit , i
ReclIsS to Co;mun t y HI4 lth
Prof es'ional4 Fees
Re cla.. !rtm. 5 i r EmplIoyeve;
Reels.is fr-m-A P ntracts aid B.U. for Doctors)
H*a Ia is 
-
. ' ')M Exp.
Add' I Al I . I n- uvcrlhead P/H Items
19 1Trustvre. r
i rev~ i ni .- i e.
$ -
$ 5,249,655
$ 12,929
$ 12,929
$ 234,296
., 214 29f
-
$ -
$ 7,910,704
$ 17.464
$ 17,464
$ 2b0,0 1
-
$ (41., 154)
252,383
$ 42,559,147
S 719,711
(135,584)
$ 584,127
$ 5,043.868
4 .034,727
( 9 20.00)
( l. 0)
.94 I
5 55,. 7
6 -4 -I
$ 614.52( c
1...,.
-4 -
B. C. H.
COf : -, I
HL.t .
5DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT Or REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LoN(; iSLAND B. C. Ii. H EAl
PATIENT SI VIC i
19S I F pent-i I I T I In ! v s I s
AccoInts Pav.bhle f
ReversiI of A' P
Allocat ion I,,1m - Overhead
1981 1 rust e . f
Recl ass to Cm I L 1h - Y 1 Exp.
ProvisIon For A crued c I nt s & C laims
A t '
$ 848,858
160,853
12,976
(269,054)
$ 753,633
$ -o
$ j,j18,71
$ 1,532.737
149,943
14,079
(386,318)
$ 1,310,441
$ -
$ 1, .
t. .17. for Doctur-,)
$ 1,178,146, 5 .
$ 9,811,562
1,920,781
57,454
(2,477,557)
(240,000)
62,012
(82,187)
$ 9,052,065
$ (440,000)
$ 2lI4., 4's
-4 'i
' ., 8 '>4
( i.
S (.' '3
$ 1, i f,'--a
- b
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
PATI ENT SFvl .E iI -.)
IntereSt
1981 Interes!t E t r s(COB)
Decrease in interes P-v a le
A lIlota i tl Lo Com:n. li i I , - Overhead
Depreciation
Buildings
Li.andcpv n
Equipment
$ 14,421 $ 215,314
(3,521) (52,576)
$ 10,900 $ 162,738
$ 202,835
2,936
47,553
$ 253,324
$ 9,129,375
ii(1.'. I i-
$
$ 251,895
96, 158
_79, 379
$ 427,432
$ 13,25 ,/1
$
S 3,513,919
(17,975)
(840 ,0b8)
$ 2,655,876
$ 2,481,802
t,257
1,019,126
$ 3,507.185
( 89_,91_0,75_0
s
Accotint
R, %r . ii
B. C. 1i.
a) -
(T1
H.,
I,.''-'Il
'I)
S 3
-
lo il Patient c,. ,.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
MATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
OTHER OPERATIlN' I<' T \1( SUBSIDIES: (cont.)
CommuLtyServct-, rrams & Real Estate Operations (cont.)
1981 Trustee Expin o e $
Peclass F- 8 .> .1 S and A & G
Reclass F' 81 v . S W - Regular Employees
Add'I AIIct.i i J P/R Items
R e t I iss f ru) -ny w
Pension Expen-l
From LOR - R-t nu a es (Health Inspectors) A/C 10221
From (I - A/C 41231 - 41234
D ; I ' I t I , i
Inter : i -
S
$
S -
$ $ (127.i05)
3.0.'7.'0
4, o39, 30J0
I 15. 5
985 .1b)
(L5., '')
148.3<
S I. mS
$ .,5:i .% 2 2 2, i" .,76)
$ I7,06
-7
B.C.H.
coM: :; r ?
HEAL._ii
I .' I),)
WI,
~.I I '
i/l: '
S I ,355,% h~
'),14
1u 1 1,
S
. I . : I I I . , I .
DEPARTKENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE
6/30/81
iATTAPAN LONG ISLAND
0PKRAT I ; TA
(enera li i
Pay As 'i t I( CoCsts
L i n i 
P, re il - 1P V. is
Plurchaises G A 1 s
ca pital It lkk In Purchases
cas S ,l RO C i [
rs h. ,-pt. Licensc Fees
Ca'sh 1) 2 '.al Examlners
Chin, in V I
$ (14,421)
(916,305)
(332, 739)
(5,162,512)
(1,849,143)
8,316,151
. 6,147
(89,300)
$ (42,122)
$ (12,929)
$ (215.314)
(1,282,828)
(59', 732)
(7,537,255)
(2,414,769)
10,375,046
53,919
(125,020)
$ (1,7 ,953)
$ (3,513,919)
(7,080,492)
(3,182,164)
(47,773.131)
(31,208,641)
144,347
61,194,319
254,598
(348,371)
125,681
(678.680)
$(32,On6 ,453)
11
(I
(3')
'-I
$ , . r4) $ (71), 1 1)
I I.41 .I ,
$ 122,91
$ 5,69l,095
$ ( '. ,9 * i2)
$ 9 ',e ,
$ 9. it!)
B. C. H.
Cm"
rJAI. r
$ 2,68/,.415
$ 48,913.002
S('6. 225. 5871
mA .:.,'  i .-' ;
.. c altd Def cl .k oL Yea -tlt
68
ATTACHMENT THREE
BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1983
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
BALANCE SHEET
6/30/83
BOSTON CITY
Cash and Cash Equivalents
Net Receivables
Due From City of Boston
Inventory
Due From Trustees of Health and Hospitals
Property, Plant and Equipment
Total Assets
Accounts Payable
Accrued Salaries and Wages
Due To Third Parties
Accrued Pension Liabilities
Accrued Judgements and Claims
Lease Obligation
Total Liabilities
Contributed Capital
Accumulated Deficit
Total Fund Equities
Total Liabilities and Fund Equity
$ 2,294,825
18,275,232
4,265,627
1,022,545
2,265,890
79,272,877
$ 107,396,996
$ 4,992,432
5,211,701
18,452,601
32,432,981
1,600,000
7,394,144
$ 70,083,859
$ 129,294,441
91,981,304
$ 37,313,137
$ 107,396,996
MATTAPAN
$ 605,459
1,995,829
(137,894)
135,896
2,089,919
$ 4,689,209
$ 474,760
384,168
(576,805)
3,890,050
131,301
$ 4,303,474
$ 7,592,047
7,206,312
$ 385,735
$ 4,689,209
LONG ISLAND
$ 1,186,310
1,700,502
(122,741)
217,604
4,688,600
$ 7,670,275
$ 599,291
586,461
(2,684,820)
5,637,205
131,301
$ 4,269,438
$ 14,488,297
11,087,460
$ 3,400,837
$ 7,670,275
TOTAL
$ 4,086,594
21,971,563
4,004,992
1,376,045
2,265,890
86,051,396
$ 119,756,480
$ 6,066,483
6,182,330
15,190,976
41,960,236
1,600,000
7,656,746
$ 78,656,771
$ 151,374,785
110,275,076
$ 41,099,709
$ 119,756,480
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
STATEMENT OF REVENUES, EXPENSES, OPERATING TRANSFERS
AND ACCUMULATED DEFICIT
6/30/83
BOSTON CITY MATTAPAN
Gross Revenue From Patient Service:
Routine Services
Special Services
Clinics
Gross Revenue From Patient Service
Gross Patient Revenue Deductions:
Contractual Allowances
Provision for Uncollectible Accounts
Gross Patient Revenue Deductions
Net Revenue From Patient Service
Other Operating Revenue
Total Net Revenue
Patient Service Expense:
Salaries & Wages
Professional Fees
Pay-As-You-Go Retirement Costs
Provision For Accrued Retirement Costs
Materials and Supplies
Provision For Accrued Judgements and Claims
Administrative and General
Interest
Depreciation
Patient Service Expense
Loss From Patient Service
Provision For Medicaid Contingency
Loss After Medicaid Contingency
Community Health and Real Estate
Loss Before Operating Assistance Subsidy
Operating Assistance Subsidy
Loss After Subsidy
Beginning Deficit
Ending Deficit
$ 45,522,991
261,810,627
51,030,065
$ 358,363,683
$ 134,653,411
148,170,765
$ 282,824,176
$ 75,539,507
4,697,357
$ 80,236,864
$ 46,991,042
10,142,124
6,999,181
4,809,636
7,883,341
698,507
11,890,675
2,570,135
4,219,801
$ 96,204,442
$ (15,967,578)
15,532,000
$ (31,499,578)
12,218,796
$ (43,718,374).
15,831,888
$ (27,886,486)
64,094,818
$ 91,981,304
$ 12,139,440
$ 12,139,440
$ 2,378,700
4,455,015
$ 6,833,715
$ 5,305,725
221,553
$ 5,527,278
$ 5,649,029
303,470
808,281
650,397
650,506
1,199,460
33,927
208,868
$ 9,503,938
$ (3,976,660)
$ (3,976,660
$ (3,976,660)
3,384,371
$ (592,289)
6,614,023
$ 7,206,312
LONG ISLAND
$ 17,847,360
$ 17,847,360
$ 5,831,049
1,540,649_
$ 7,371,698
$ 10,475,662
47,661
$ 10,523,323
$ 7,894,101
265,284
1,074,748
864,813
1,082,952
1,414,532
153,620
394,420
$ 13,144,470
$ (2,621,147)
$ (2,621,147)
$ (2,621,147)
2,284,092
$ (337,055)
10,750,405
$ 11,087,460
TOTAL
$ 75,509,791
261,810,627
51,030,065
$ 388,350,483
$ 142,863,160
154,166,429
$ 297,029,589
$ 91,'120,894
4,66, 571
$ 96,237,465
$ 60,534,172
10,710,878
8,882,210
6,324,846
9,616,799
698,507
14,504,667
2,757,682
4,823,089
$ 118,852,850
$ (22,565,385)
15,532,000
$ (38,097,385)
12,218,796
$ (50,316,181)
21,500,351
$ (28,815,830)
81,459,246
$ 110,275,076
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ATTACHMENT FOUR
DESCRIPTION OF THE SELECTED DEPARTMENTS
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The Planning Officel
This office is basically administrative in character and has
existed since September 1983. Before this office was created,
planning functions were shared among other units, most notably the
Administration Services Department. This department is structured
simply, having one Vice President and one Assistant
Functions are divided into analytic and political categories. An
example of the analytical function is performing a cost/benefit
analysis of the level of programmatic resources required to meet the
changing health needs of BCH's catchment population. This unit serves
as an intermediary when two or more units have conflicts. Thus at
times political common sense must be called upon. Persons in this
office prepare strategic plans for the utilization of BCH resources in
light of projected demand.
Fiscal Services 2
This department is the administrative unit which is principally
responsible for detecting deficits and responding to them by three
major control mechanisms. First, fiscal control is exercised when the
250 cost centers in BCH submit their individual budgets to Fiscal
Services. The individual budget requests of the cost centers are
reviewed and modified if needed. The al tered request is then returned
to the cost center. After all of the cost center budget requests are
reviewed and aggregated, they are submited to the Boston City Council.
At this stage the BCH budget request for the fiscal year is voted
upon. Adjustments are made as deemed proper. The request is
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forwarded to the Mayor's Budget Office for approval at this point.
After securing a budget for the fiscal year, Fiscal Services
implements a second control to reduce the variance between budgeted
allocations and actual costs. The control mechanism centers around
the department's monitoring and billing functions. Fiscal Services
monitors charges for services and observes the spending patterns of
the other seven units in BCH to ensure compliance with budgetary
guidelines. If a discrepancy between the actual budget and
expenditures is detected, a third control measure is employed. The
goal of this mechanism is to secure additional resoruces for BCH by
applying for supplemental monies from the City of Boston. Thus
further funds awarded to BCH after the initial budget results from
this department's detection of and response to fiscal shortage. It is
headed by a Chief Financial Officer and is heirarchially structured.
Addiction Services is headed by one Deputy Commissioner and
staffed by two Assistants. Because of its substantial network
throughout the health community, Addiction Services occassionally
refers its patients to the staff of other centers where care remains
consistent and of professional quality. The department is divided
into three main functional areas. I have described them below.
The Narcotics Program
The narcotics division supports 120 drug-dependent persons in a
methodone treatment program. Eighty of the 120 clients receive free
service. Costs of the treatment average $350 per day per person.
Thus at the rate of 43,800 visits per year, expenses total about $15.3
million. Treatment may last for a maximum of two years and consists
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of therapy, establishing goals for decreasing chemical dependence and
enhancing interpersonal relationships.
The budget request for fiscal year 1985 for this program is
$394,000. With 66 percent of the clients receiving free care and an
estimated revenue of $30,720 from the remaining uninsured persons who
pay a one-time fee, deficits and the uncertainty it prompts will
continue.
The Alcohol Program
Clients are brought to this service by the diagnostic and
referral section in the emergency room of BCH. Persons who are deemed
to benefit from treatment are placed in a detoxification program
lasting twenty-eight days. BCH incurs an operating expense of $25 per
person per day which is reimbursed by the Department of Welfare at the
rate of $6.10 per person per day. The $225,000 budget request for
fiscal year 1985 will not cover all of the expenses. Deficits will
again be a financial reality for this program.
The Homeless Program
This program is located at the Long Island Hospital and serves
about two hundred guests. The budget request for the 1985 fiscal year
is $719,000. It is estimated that $330,000 of this amount will be
funded by the City of Boston; $300,000 will be funded by the U.S.
Federal Government through Massachusetts. Remaining funds will come
from Boston through CDBG. Persons in the Addiction Services
department forecast substantial in city support in the forthcoming
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years.
Homeless persons are received into this facility between 3:00-
6:00 pm each day. Cdre is given by qualified medical personnel to
lessen the multiple medical, psychological and social problems of this
population. Some of the health issues with which the program is
concerned are: infections, infestations (i.e., body lice), states of
nutritional deficiency, cellulitis and leg ulcers, trauma and sexual
assault, alcoholism, tuberculosis and alienation.
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